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INDIANS - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE INTERPRETATION OF NORTH
DAKOTA'S INDIAN CIVIL JURISDICTION ACT.

This case was reversed and remanded by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 106
S. Ct. 2305 (1986). The United States Supreme Court determined that
federal law preventedNorth Dakota'sdisclaimer ofjurisdiction over the tribe's
suit. Id. at 2310. The Court also stated that North Dakota's interest in
requiringall citizens to bear equally the benefits and burdens of access to state
courts unduly burdened the federal government's interest in tribal autonomy
and selfgovernance. Id. at 2312.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation brought an action against Wold Engineering, a nonIndian engineering firm, for negligence in the design of a water
supply system that Wold Engineering had installed on the
reservation.' The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 The district court determined that it
could not entertain a civil action involving Indians that arose3
within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
Three Affiliated Tribes appealed, and the North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision. 4 The United States
1. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510, 511 (N.D. 1982). Wold
designed and constructed a water supply system for Four Bears Village. Brief for Appellee at 2,
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985). Work on the project
occurred entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. Id. After
the project was completed, Three Affiliated Tribes initiated a lawsuit in district court. Id. The suit
alleged that Wold had negligently designed and constructed the water intake system. Id. In its
answer, Wold counterclaimed allegin.j that Three Affiliated Tribes had not paid the full contract
price of the project. !d. Thereafter, Wold moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id.
2. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510, 510(N.D. 1982).

3. Id.
4. Id. On July 1, 1982, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the
state court lacked.jurisdiction to decide Three Affiliated Tribes' complaint. Id. The court determined
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Supreme Court granted certiorari and thereafter, vacated the
decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court.5 The Court then
remanded the case to determine whether the North Dakota
Supreme Court had based its decision on a misconception of federal
law. 6 On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that an
Indian tribe could bring a civil action in state court, provided it
complied with North Dakota's Indian Civil Jurisdiction Act. Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.
1985).
As a general rule, Indian reservations are beyond the
legislative and judicial jurisdiction of state governments. 7 This
principle was established before North Dakota was granted
statehood in 1889.1 As a condition for admission to the union,
North Dakota disclaimed all rights to govern Indian lands. 9 As a
that state courts lacked jurisdiction because the enrolled Indian residents of the reservation had not
consented, pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota
Century Code, to the state's assumption of jurisdiction. Id. at 511-12. For a discussion of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text; for a discussion of chapter 2719, see infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
5. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 159 (1984).
6. Id. The United States Supreme Court stressed that it was not overruling the North Dakota
Supreme Court, nor declaring the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of chapter 27-19
erroneous. Id. at 159. The Court also stated that it had not invalidated the North Dakota statute and
emphasized that it was merely remanding for further consideration in light of its explanation of
federal law. Id.
7. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (6 Pet.) (1832). In Worcester the United States'Supreme
Court held that state law had no force or effect in Indian country because tribes were considered
separate and distinct nations. Id. at 561. In writing the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall stated that an
Intlian tribe comprises "a distinct community, occupying its own territory, . . . and the whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States." Id.
8. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 142 (1984).
9. See Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889). The enabling act of 1889, which
granted North Dakota admittance to the Union, states as follows:
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by
the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the
United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States.
Id. at 677. North Dakota's original constitution echoed the enabling act's provisions in almost
identical terms. See N.D. CONST. art. XVI, S 203 (1889, amended 1958). Section 203 of article XVI
of the original North Dakota Constitution provided as follows:
The i eople inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes,
and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and that said
Indian Lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress
of the United States.
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result, these lands were left under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the federal government. 10
The need for this jurisdictional disclaimer terminated in 1953
when Congress passed Public Law 280.11 Public Law 280 allowed
the federal government to transfer jurisdiction over Indians to the
states. 12 It also permitted states to amend their constitutions and to
enact affirmative legislation. assuming both civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians. 13 Furthermore, the law allowed states to
unilaterally assume jurisdiction over Indians without the tribes'
14
consent.
In 1958, the North Dakota Legislature amended the state
constitution to authorize acceptance of state court jurisdiction over
10. ThreeAffiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 142.
11. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. 83-254, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. 5 1162 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. S 1360 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 6 of Public Law
280 removed any legal impediment to state assumption of civil jurisdiction over Indians. See id. %6.
The section provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the
consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where
necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove
any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act
shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such
State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or
statutes as the case may be.
Id.
Sections 2 and 4 of Public Law 280 give California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin full jurisdiction over Indians. Id. §§ 2, 4. Section 7 allows all other states to assume
jurisdiction upon the enactment of appropriate legislation. Id. § 7. Section 7 provides as follows:
The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not having
jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to
both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such
manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and
bind the State to assumption thereof.
Id.
12. See id. The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the purpose of Public Law 280 was
to permit states to assume jurisdictional responsibility over Indians. Three Affiliated Tribes, 321
N.W.2d at 5.11. The court's reasoning was derived from a statement by the United States Supreme
Court. Id.; see Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, reh'.a denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979). In Washington the United States Supreme Court stated that Public Law 280 was enacted in
part to deal with the "problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of
adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement." Id. at 471 (quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 379 (1976)).
13. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1982) and 28 U.S.C. §1360 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
14. See id. As originally enacted, Public Law 280 did not require states to obtain the consent of
the affected Indian tribes before assuming civil or criminal.jurisdiction. Id. Five states were initially
granted immediate, full jurisdiction by Public Law 280. Id. All other states, including North Dakota,
became "option states" and were required to comply with §§ 6 and 7 of Public Law 280. Id. Sections
6 and 7 allowed states to amend their state constitutions and to pass affirmative state legislation to
assume jurisdiction over Indians. Id. Thus, because tribal consent was not required, a state could
unilaterally assume Indian civil.jurisdiction. Id. For a discussion of Public Law 280, see supra note II
and accompanying text.
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Indians.15 In 1963, the North Dakota Legislature enacted chapter
27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, entitled the Indian Civil
Jurisdiction Act.' 6 The Chapter permits state courts to accept
jurisdiction over civil claims that arise on an Indian reservation if
either the enrolled tribal members 7 or an individual Indian
citizen 8 consents to such jurisdiction.' 9 It also provides for
15. See N.D. CONST. art. XIII, S 1, cl. 2. Clause 2 of section 1 of article XIHI of the North
Dakota Constitution amended S 203 of article XVI of the original North Dakota Constitution. Id.
The clause provides in part as follows:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes,
and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and that said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress
of the United States, provided, however, that the legislative assembly of the state of
North Dakota may, upon such terms and conditions as it shall adopt, provide for the
acceptance of such jurisdiction as may be deligated to the state by Act of Congress.
Id.
16. Indian Civil jurisdiction Act, ch. 242, 1963 N.D. Laws 408 (codified in N.D. CENT. CODE
ch. 27-19 (1974 & Supp. 1985)).
17. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-19-02 (1974). Section 27-19-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides for tribal consent to state civil jurisdiction as follows:
Acceptance of jurisdiction may be by either of the following methods:
1. Upon petition of a majority of the enrolled residents of a reservation who are
eighteen years of age or older; or
2. The affirmative vote of the majority of enrolled residents voting who are eighteen
years of age or older, at an election called and supervised by the North Dakota Indian
affairs commission upon petition of fifteen percent of those eligible to vote at such an
election.
Id.
18. See id. S 27-19-05. Section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code provides for
individual consent to civil jurisdiction as follows:
An individual Indian may accept state jurisdiction as to himself and his property by
executing a statement consenting to and declaring himself and his property to be
subject to state civil jurisdiction as herein provided. Such jurisdiction shall become
effective on the date of execution of such statement. The statement accepting state
jurisdiction shall be filed in the office of the county auditor of the county in which the
person resides and when so filed shall be conclusive evidence of acceptance of state
civil jurisdiction as provided herein.
Id.
19. See id. S 27-19-01 (Supp. 1985). Section 27-19-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides as follows:
In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 83-280 and section 1 of article XI of
the Constitution of North Dakota, jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be
extended over all civil claims for relief which arise on an Indian reservation upon
acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance
the jurisdiction of the state is to the same extent that the state has jurisdiction over
other civil claims for relief, and those civil laws of this state that are of general
application to private property have the same force and effect within such Indian
reservation or Indian country as they have elsewhere within this state.
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subsequent withdrawal of both tribal and individual consent to
state civil jurisdiction. 0 The Chapter limits jurisdiction by
prohibiting the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of real or
personal property belonging to an
Indian or Indian tribe that is
21
held in trust by the United States.
Prior to the constitutional amendment and the adoption of
chapter 27-19, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Vermillion
v. Spotted Elk. 22 Vermillion involved an automobile collision on the
Standing Rock Indian Reservation.2 3 The plaintiff and defendants
were enrolled tribal members residing on that reservation. 24 The
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the jurisdictional
disclaimers contained in the enabling act and the original North
Dakota Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian
2 5
country only in cases involving an interest in Indian land itself.
Because the plaintiff's claim did not involve an interest in land, the
26
court concluded that it was free to exercise jurisdiction.
Chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code is the product of an interim study of the
North Dakota Legislative Research Committee. Three Affiliated Tribes, 364 N.W.2d at 101. Senate
bill 30 was drafted in response to the Committee's report. Id. at 102. For the text of the Committee's
report, see REPORT OF THE.NORTH DAKOTA LEGisLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, INDIAN AFFAIRS, 31
(1963). Senate bill 30 originally provided for unilateral assumption by the state of exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil causes of action that arose on Indian reservations. Three Affiliated Tribes, 364
N.W.2d at 102. However, numerous Indian leaders and their attorneys appeared at a public hearing
to oppose the state's unilateral assumption of jurisdiction. Id. at 103 & n.7. As a result, Senate bill 30
was amended to provide for acceptance of state civil jurisdiction only upon acceptance by the Indian
citizens as provided in chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 103.
20. See N.D. CENT. CODE §5 27-19-11 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1985). Section 27-19-11 aliows for
withdrawal of tribal acceptance from civil jurisdiction by petition of three-fourths of the enrolled
Indians on the reservation who are eighteen years of age or older. Id. S 27-19-11 (1974). The petition
must be filed with the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission. Id. Section 27-19-12 provides that
once the Commission certifies the petition to be in compliance with 5 27-19-11, the Governor shall
issue a withdrawal proclamation officially terminating.jurisdiction previously established by tribal
acceptance. Id. 5 27-19-12 (Supp. 1985). Section 27-19-13 provides that an Indian may withdraw his
or her individual acceptance of state civil jurisdiction by filing a statement with the county auditor.
Id. S 27-19-13.
21. Id. 5 27-19-08. Section 27-19-08 protects Indian property that is held in trust by the United
States from attachment, even if that individual Indian or tribe consents to jurisdiction. Id.
22. 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957), overruled, Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256, 258 (N.D.
1973).
23. Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432, 433 (N.D. 1957), overruled, Gourneau v. Smith,
207 N.W.2d 256, 258 (N.D. 1973). Vermillion involved a negligence action arising from an
automobile accident between enrolled Indians residing on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. 85
N.W.2d at 433. In Vermillion the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted an expansive approach
toward jurisdiction over Indians by recognizing state court jurisdiction over all civil cases, not
involving Indian lands, between Indians residing on reservations. See id. at 438.
24. Id. at 433.
25. Id. at 438. For the text of the enabling act and the jurisdictional disclaimer in the original
North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 9. The court reasoned that, because Indians are citizens of
the United States and courts are to be open to everyone, Indians should enjoy state court jurisdiction
even though the state legislature had taken no action pursuant to Public Law 280. Id. The court also
noted that it was not Congress' intent to prohibit state jurisdiction over Indians when the claim did
not arise from, or have any relation to, the land on the Indian reservation itself. Id. at 437.
Therefore, the court adopted an expansive jurisdictional basis that allowed state courts to hear civil
cases involving Indians, provided that the subject of the claim was not the Indian land itself. Id. at
438.
26. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that, because enrolled Indians are citizens of
the United States and residents of the State of North Dakota, they are subject to state civil
jurisdiction, unless the claim involves Indian lands. Id. at 438.
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Thereafter, the legislature amended the state constitution 27
28
and adopted chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.
The North Dakota Supreme Court first interpreted the legislation
in 1963 in In Re Whiteshield.29 The court in Whiteshield held that the
state constitutional amendment 30 and subsequent legislative
action 3' amounted to a complete disclaimer of state jurisdiction in
all civil matters involving Indians unless the requirements of
chapter 27-19 were fulfilled. 32 The court determined that chapter
27-19 prohibited the state's exercise of jurisdiction unless either the
tribe or an individual Indian consented. 33 In making this
determination, the court questioned the previous inconsistent
holding in Vermillion.34 Subsequent to Whiteshield, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has consistently disclaimed state civil jurisdiction
over Indians in actions arising on reservations if the tribe or
individual Indian involved has not consented, pursuant to chapter
35
27-19, to the state's exercise of jurisdiction.
27. See N.D. CONST. art. XIII, S 1, cl. 2. For the text of the constitutional amendment, see supra
note 15.
28. See Indian Civil Jurisdiction Act, ch. 242, 1963 N.D. Laws 408 (codified in N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 & Supp. 1985)). For a discussion of chapter 27-19, see supra notes 16-21 and
accompanying text.
29. 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963). Whiteshield involved the termination of Indian parents'
parental rights by a county juvenile commissioner. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694, 695 (N.D.
1963).
30. See N.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1, cl. 2.
31. See Indian Civil Jurisdiction Act, ch. 242, 1963 N.D. Laws 408 (codified in N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 & Supp. 1985)).
32. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D. 1963). The court determined that the
constitutional amendment and chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, together created a
complete disclaimer of any previous or future jurisdiction over civil claims that arise on an Indian
reservation, except upon consent by the tribal members in a manner provided by chapter 27-19. Id.
33. Id. at 697-98. The court in Whiteshield noted that since § 27-19-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which provides for tribal acceptance of state court civil jurisdiction, had not been
complied with, there existed no state jurisdiction over the termination case. Id. at 698; see also N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 27-19-02, -05 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
34. 124 N.W.2d at 696. Vermillion denied state civil jurisdiction only in cases involving
reservation land. 85 N.W.2d at 438. The court in Whiteshield stated that the decision in Vermillion
contradicted the court's complete disclaimer approach, which denies any power of the state to
exercise jurisdiction, except upon compliance with chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.
124 N.W. 2d at 696. For a discussion of Vermillion, see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
35. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510, 512 (N.D. 1982). The
North Dakota Supreme Court, in its initial decision regarding the issue presented in Three Affiliated
Tribes, stated that state courts do not have jurisdiction over civil claims arising on an Indian
reservation unless the tribal members of that reservation vote to accept jurisdiction. Id. This
statement was consistent with previous cases decided by the court. See, e.g., Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). In Gourneau an action was brought for personal injuries arising from an
automobile accident between enrolled tribal members that occurred on their Indian reservation. Id.
at 257. The North Dakota Supreme Court cited Whiteshield for the proposition that chapter 27-19
operated as a complete disclaimer of state jurisdiction over civil claims on an Indian reservation, in
the absence of tribal acceptance of jurisdiction. Id. at 258. The court stated that, until the enrolled
tribal members consent to state jurisdiction, jurisdiction may not be assumed by state courts over
any claim involving tribal members arising within the boundaries of the Indian reservation. Id. at
259; see also Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1975) (state court lacked
.jurisdiction to hear a claim by a non-Indian 'against enrolled Indians involving an automobile
accident occurring on a reservation); White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D. 1973)
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In 1968, Public Law 280, which had allowed the federal
government to unilaterally transfer jurisdiction over Indians to the
state, was amended by Public Law 284.36 The amendment requires
tribal consent before state courts can assume criminal or civil
jurisdiction over tribal members. 37 According to Public Law 284,
tribal consent can be obtained only if a majority of the adult
Indians in the tribe consent to state court jurisdiction. 38 The
39
requirements of Public Law 284, however, are not retroactive.
Ultimately, a conflict arose between Public Law 284, which
40
requires tribal consent by a majority vote of the tribe's members,
and chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
allows for consent to jurisdiction by individual Indians.4 1 The
North Dakota Supreme Court first considered the conflict between
42
Public Law 284 and chapter 27-19 in Nelson v. Dubois.
In Nelson the court determined that an individual Indian could
no longer confer civil jurisdiction upon the state pursuant to section
27-19-05.4 3 Instead, the court determined that Public Law 284
constituted a federal preemption of state jurisdiction and,
therefore, tribal consent by a majority vote was the exclusive
method of Indian consent. 4" The court also relied on federal
(absent Indian consent to state jurisdiction, neither income earned by Indians on the reservation nor
purchases made by them are subject to taxation by state authorities).
36. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 79 (1968) (codified, in
part, at 25 U.S.C. S 1322 (1982)).
37. Id.
38. Id. Public Law 284 was codified in part in S 1326 of title 25 of the United States Code. See 25
U.S.C. 5 1326 (1982). Section 1326 provides that a malority of the enrolled Indians within the
affected reservation must vote to consent to state jurisdiction at a special election held for that
purpose. Id. The Secretary of the Interior is required to call this special election when requested by
the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20% of the enrolled Indian adults. Id.
39. See Civil Rights Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title IV, S 403, 82 Stat. 73, 79
(1968) (codified, in part, at 25 U.S.C. S 1323 (1982)). Section 1323 provides that a state may return
to the United States any or all measure of criminal or civil jurisdiction assumed prior to the passage
of Public Law 284. 25 U.S.C. S 1323(a)(1982).
Section 1323 provided for the repeal of § 7 of Public Law 280, which had made it possible for
states to assert jurisdiction unilaterally. Id. S 1323(b). However, because Public Law 284 was not
retroactive, this repeal did not affect statejurisdiction assumed prior to the repeal of Public Law 280.
See id.
40. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title IV, S 402, 82 Stat. 73, 79
(1968) (codified, in part, at 25 U.S.C. 5 1322 (1982)). For a discussion of Public Law 284, see supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
41. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974). For a discussion of individual Indian consent to
state civil jurisdiction, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
42. 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). In Nelson an individual Indian had consented to state civil
jurisdiction. Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54, 55 (N.D. 1975). The case involved a civil action
between an enrolled Indian and a non-Indian which arose from an automobile accident on a
reservation. Id.
43. Id. at 56. For the text of S 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 18.
44. Id. at 56-57. The court stated that state jurisdiction over claims arising on reservations could
be obtained only by state and tribal compliance with Public Law 284. Id. at 57. The court also stated
that since the enactment of Public Law 284, "[aln individual [Indian] defendant ]was] no more able
to confer jurisdiction upon the state than [was] a tribal council or a State, acting unilaterally." Id.
Therefore, the court concluded that § 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code was invalid. Id.
For the text of S 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 18.
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preemption to deny the existence of "residuary jurisdiction" in
North Dakota.4 5 The concept of "residuary jurisdiction" allows a
state to unilaterally exercise jurisdiction on a reservation if such
jurisdiction does not interfere with tribal self-government.4 6 By
refusing to recognize "residuary jurisdiction," the North Dakota
Supreme Court followed the trend, established by states
interpreting Public Law 284, to place more emphasis on applicable
federal statutes, and less on traditional notions of tribal sovereignty
or inherent state powers.4 7 The precedential significance of Nelson is
that tribal consent is necessary for state court civil jurisdiction, and
4 8
that there is no "residuary jurisdiction" in North Dakota.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the legal background
existing in 1982 when Three Affiliated Tribes initiated their action
against Wold Engineering. 9 Following the North Dakota Supreme
Court's affirmation of the district court's denial of jurisdiction,
Three Affiliated Tribes petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari, and review was granted. 50
The United States Supreme Court concluded that Public Laws
280 and 284 do not prevent North Dakota from exercising
jurisdiction over Indians. 5 1 This conclusion was based upon two
45. Id. at 57-58. In reaching its conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined to follow
the United States Supreme Court's "infringement test." Id. at 58; see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959). In Williams the Court stated that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws ant be ruled by them." Id. at 220. In Nelson, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated
that Public Law 284 was a "governing Act of Congress." 232 N.W.2d at 58. Therefore, the
"infringement test" was abandoned and the court focused its decision on federal preemption rather
than on the degree to which Indians' sovereign rights may have been infringed. Id.
46. See 233 N.W.2d at 60 (VogelJ., dissenting); see also Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d
139, 143 (N. D. 1980) (discussing the concept of" residuary jurisdiction").
47. 232 N.W.2d at 58; see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973). In McClanahan the United States Supreme Court stated that the trend toward reliance on
federal preemption renders questions regarding the existence of residual tribal sovereignty moot. Id.
at 172 n.8. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Public Law 284 is a clear
congressional statement of federal preemption because it applies to the assumption of any subject
matter jurisdiction by any state over any Indian reservation. 232 N.W.2d at 58. The court concluded
that there is no "residuary state jurisdiction" and that state jurisdiction can be obtained only by
strict compliance with Public Law 284. Id. at 57-58.
48. See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980). In Malaterre the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree when
ote. party to the decree is a resident of an Indian reservation. Id. at 143. The court recognized the
general rule that a court having.jurisdiction to hear a divorce action continues to have jurisdiction to
modify ti decree. Id. at 142. The court concluded this general rule is inapplicable, however, when
one of the parties to the divorce is a resident of an Indian reservation. Id. In such a case, jurisdiction
is lost unless the Indian tribe has complied with Public Law 284 and chapter 27-19 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id. at 142-43; see also United States ex rel. Hall v. Hansen, 303 N.W.2d 349,
350 (N. D. 1981) (individual Indian litigant cannot confer jurisdiction upon a state court).
49. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1982). In the original
decision of Three Affiliated Tribes, the North Dakota Surpeme Court continued to disclaim state
assumption of.jurisdiction absent tribal consent. See id. at 512.
50. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
51. Id. at 149-51.
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factors. First, the Court reasoned that the tribe's sovereignty would
not be undermined if the tribe was required to seek relief in state
courts rather than tribal courts.5 2 Second, the Court stated that no
federal law required North Dakota to displace jurisdiction lawfully
53
assumed prior to the enactment of Public Laws 280 and 284.
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court determined that if the
North Dakota Supreme Court denied civil jurisdiction over
Indians, its decision must be based on state, rather than federal
4
law. 5
However, the Court was unsure whether the North Dakota
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 27-19-05 of the North

Dakota Century Code was based on a misconception of federal
law. 55 Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of the North
Dakota Supreme Court and remanded the case. 5 6 The issues to be
determined on remand were whether state law precluded

52. Id. at 148-49. The Court recognized the importance of preserving tribal sovereignty Id. at
148. The Court stated, however, that tribal self-government would not be impeded if an individual
Indian was allowed to enter state courts to seek relief on equal terms with other persons for claims
against non-Indians arising on reservations. Id. at 148-49. In reaching this decision, the Court
declared that neither Public .Law 280 nor Public Law 284 required or authorized North Dakota to
abandon the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion. Id. at 150. The Court recognized that the
expansive civil .jurisdiction over all claims not involving an interest in Indian land, as recognized in
Vermillion, could not be squared with principles of tribal autonomy. Id. at 148. Therefore, the Court
stated that, to the extent Vermillion permitted North Dakota state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over claims between Indians or non-Indians against Indians, it intruded impermissibly on tribal selfgovernance. Id. However, the Court approved the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over claims
by Indians against non-Indians. Id. (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 173 (1973)). The Court emphasized that the exercise of state jurisdiction was especially
compatible with tribal autonomy in cases such as Three Affiliated Tribes, in which the suit was brought
by the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 149.
53. Id. at 149-51. The Court reasoned that the exercise of state jurisdiction would not be
inconsistent with federal or tribal interests reflected in North Dakota's enabling act or Public Law
280. Id. at 149. The Court noted that Public Law 280 did not authorize states to disclaim jurisdiction
lawfully, assumed prior to its enactment. Id. at 150. The Court also stated that Public Law 284,
which amended Public Law 280 by requiring tribal consent to jurisdiction, was not retroactive. Id.
Therefore, Public Law 284 did not displace jurisdiction assumed by the states prior to its enactment.
Id. at 150-51. Thus, the Court stated that the jurisdiction previously recognized by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Vermillion continued to exist, provided the jurisdiction was lawfully assumed at the
time that case was decided. Id. at 151.
54. Id. Because federal law did not bar North Dakota's assumption of jurisdiction, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's denial of jurisdiction
was dictated by state law. Id. However, the United States Supreme Court concluded that it was
necessary to remand the case because it was unclear whether the North Dakota Supreme Court had
relied on a misconception of federal law when it interpreted the relevant North Dakota statutes. Id. at
152-54.
55. Id. at 153. The United States Supreme Court declared erroneous any assumption that
Public Law 280 and Public Law 284 either authorized North Dakota to disclaim preexisting
.jurisdiction or affirmatively forbade the exercise of preexisting jurisdiction absent tribal consent. Id.
at 154. The Court was unsure whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's holding in Nelson was
based on an erroneous assumption. Id. at 156-57. Specifically, the Court questioned whether the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Nelson incorrectly assumed that Public Law 284 required them to
interpret 5 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code restrictively. Id. at 157. Because the United
States Supreme Court was unsure whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of
chapter 27-19 was based on a misconception of federal law, it remanded the case for reconsideration.
Id. at 159.
56. Id.
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jurisdiction, and if so, whether
such preclusion violated either the
5 7
state or federal constitution.
On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court again declared
that section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code was
valid.- 8 The court determined that Three Affiliated Tribes, acting
as an indidual "entity," could consent to the civil jurisdiction of
state courts, provided the tribe complied with section 27-19-05 of
the North Dakota Century Code.5 9 The court also concluded
that any "residuary jurisdiction," if it had ever existed, was
terminated by the enactment of chapter 27-19.6 0 Therefore,
because Three Affiliated Tribes had not consented to state court
'jurisdiction, the court concluded that North Dakota's state courts
lacked jurisdiction to hear the controversy. 61
Three Affiliated Tribes argued that chapter 27-19 of the North
57. Id.; see also Three Affiliated Tribes, 364 N.W.2d at 104 (determining that chapter 27-19 does
not violate either the state or federal constitutions). In Vermillion, the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld the exercise of state jurisdiction in all cases except those involving reservation land itself.
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432, 437 (N.D. 1957), overruled, Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256, 258 (N.D. 1973). For a discussion of Vermillion, see supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
Justice Rehnquist, in a strong dissent, stated that thejurisdiction claimed in Vermillion had been
discredited by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Lee. Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 160 (1984) (Rehnquist, .J., dissenting); see also Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959). Justice Rehnquist noted that the principles of tribal autonomy recognized in
Williams v. Lee clearly prevented intrusion into tribal affairs without affirmative legislative
action pursuant to Public Law 280. 467 U.S. at 160-61. Since the jurisdiction claimed in Vermillion
was not "lawfully assumed," it did not survive the enactment of Public Law 280. Id. at 161..Justice
Rehnquist accused the majority of glossing over this problem by recasting Vermillion to fit its own
needs. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority had treated Vermillion as claiming jurisdiction
only over suits by Indians against non-Indians. Id. at 162. Only by doing so, Justice Rehnquist
stated, was the majority able to conclude that Vermillion involved "lawfully assumed jurisdiction."
ld..Justice Rehnquist stated that he was "nonplussed" by the majority's reading of Vermillion. Id.
Justice Rehnquist continued by stating that without Vermillion, the majority's reasoning simply
crumbled. Id. at 163. After Public Law,280, state courts could assume jurisdiction only by
affirmative legislation. Id. North Dakota did take affirmative legislative action when it enacted
chapter 27-19, but it conditioned its assumption of jurisdiction on tribal consent. Id. at 164. Justice
Rehnquist noted that since Three Affiliated Tribes had not consented, North Dakota had no
jurisdiction over the case. Id.
58. Three Affiliated Tribes, 364 N.W.2d at 104. On remand the North Dakota Supreme Court
extensively analyzed the legislative history of chapter 27-19 to determine the legislature's intent in
enacti.ng the Chapter. Id. at 101-03. The court determined that the legislative purpose was to
"accommodate the will" of the Indian people by providing for both tribal and individual acceptance
and individual withdrawal of state jurisdiction. Id. at 103. In light of this intent, the court disavowed
language in Nelson that had declared § 27-19-05 invalid. Id. at 104.
59. Id. at 103-04; see also N.D. CENT. CooE S 27-19-05 (1974) (authorizing individual consent to
state court jurisdiction). The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that if Three Affiliated Tribes
acted as an "entity" and "individually" consented to state civil jurisdiction then the nonexempt
property of the tribe, as distinguished from the property of individual Indians, would be subject to
levy and execution pursuant to the state court.judgment. Three Affiliated Tribes, 364 N.W.2d at 104;
see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-21-06, -08 (Supp. 1985) (authorizing the levy and execution of the
judgment debtor's nonexempt property).
60. Three Affiliated Tribes, 364 N.W.2d at 104. The court determined that neither the legislative
history of chapter 27-19, nor the text of the Chapter itself recognized any type of "residuary
jurisdiction." Id. Thus, the court implied that it could not recognize any.jurisdiction, residuary or
otherwise, that may have been valid in light of the holding in Vermillion. See id.
61. Id. at 104.
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Dakota Century Code violated its state and federal constitutional
rights. 62 First, the tribe argued that its federal constitutional right
to due process 63 was violated by the state's refusal to assume
jurisdiction. 64 The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that
Indians are neither deprived of a protected interest nor denied
access to state courts because of legislative or judicial action by the
state.6 5 Instead, the court declared that the state, by enacting
chapter 27-19, offered Indians access to state courts. 66 Therefore,
the court concluded that the Indian people deprived themselves of
the due process afforded non-Indians by refusing to seek the access
to courts offered by chapter 27-19.67
Second, Three Affiliated Tribes argued that its constitutional
right of equal protection 6 8 was violated by the state's refusal to
accept jurisdiction. 69 Three Affiliated Tribes alleged that chapter
27-19 employed a constitutionally suspect classification scheme that
70
singled out Indians for disadvantaged treatment.
Initially, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the
62. Id. at 104-07.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its Jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
64. 364 N.W.2d at 104-05. Three Affiliated Tribes asserted that chapter 27-19 deprived tribal
Indians of their property rights and their civil liberties, which include the right "to sue." Id. at 105.
The tribe contended that a "cause of action is a species of property protected by the clue process
clause.- Id. at 106; see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (a
"cause of action" is protected by the due process clause). Thus, the tribe argued that the North
Dakota Supreme Court should follow a two prong due process test: "whether [the tribe] was
deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was . . . due." Three Affiliated Tribes, 364
N.W.2d at 105-06; see Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422,428 (1982) (applying the two prong test
to determine that the plaintiff had been denied due process).
65. 364 N.W.2d at 106.
66. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court stressed that Three Affiliated Tribes was not deprived
of, but rather, was offered due process by 5 27-19-05. Id.
67. Id.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. For the text of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, see supra note 63.
69. See 364 N.W.2d at 106-07.
70. Id. Three Affiliated Tribes contended that chapter 27-19 singled out a discrete, insular
minority for disadvantaged legislative treatment, and hence, was constitutionally suspect. See id.
Wold asserted that Three Affiliated Tribes, in effect, classified itself by refusing to consent to the
.Jurisdiction offered by chapter 27-19. See Brief for Appellee at 37, Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Eng'g, P.C., 364 N.W.2d 98 (N.D. 1985). Wold also argued that Indians reside in a unique political
environment which they enjoy and attempt to perpetuate. Id. at 41. Wold stated that, because
Indians reside in this unique environment, they are not similarly situated to non-Indians. Id.
Therefore, Wold concluded that Indians, being different in fact, need not be treated in law as though
they were the same as non-Indians. Id.
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unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal laws authorized
the federal government to classify Indians in a manner that might
otherwise be constitutionally offensive. 7 1 The court concluded that
differential treatment of Indians by states acting under federal law
did not result in a suspect classification.7 2 Thus, the North Dakota
73
Supreme Court found no violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Three Affiliated Tribes also contended that chapter 27-19 of
the North Dakota Century Code violated three sections of the
North Dakota Constitution. 74 Initially, Three Affiliated Tribes
argued that the Chapter violated article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution, which guarantees all people equal access to
state courts. 75 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
this section was not violated because, if the tribe complied with
section 27-19-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, the courts
71. 364 N.W.2d at 106 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). In Morton v. Mancari,
the United States Supreme Court recognized Congress' plenary power over Indians. 417 U.S. at
551. The Court noted that this power is drawn from the United States Constitution. Id. at 551-52.
Clause 3 of section 8 of article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce ... with Indian tribes." Id. at 552; see U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8, cl.3. The Court stated that
this provision authorized separate legislation for Indians. 417 U.S. at 552.
The North Dakota Supreme Court had previously recognized the futility of an equal protection
claim by Indians seeking state jurisdiction. See Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). In
Gourneau the court determined that an Indian plaintiff was not denied her right to bring an action in
state court because of her status as an Indian. Id. at 259. Instead, the court stated, she was denied
that right because the alleged tort was committed by an Indian on an Indian reservation, and
because the Indians of that reservation had not accepted statejurisdiction. Id.
72. 364 N.W.2d at 106-07 (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463
(1979), reh'g denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979)). In Confederated Bands the Court stated that .'the unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal Government to enact legislation'
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive."
Confederated Bands, 439 U.S. at 500-01 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
The dispute in Confederated Bands involved chapter 37.12 of the Revised Code of Washington'
which is analogous to chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century C6de. Compare WAS1H. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 37.12 (1964) (assumption of state jurisdiction over Indian claims by tribal compliance with
statute) with N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974 & Supp. 1985) (procedures for assumption of state
.jurisdiction over Indian claims). Both chapters were enacted in response to Public Law 280. See 364
N.W.2d at 106-07. In Confederated Bands the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the
federal government's plenary power over Indians allows it to classify Indians in a manner that would
normally be considered "suspect." 439 U.S. at 500-01. Although states do not share this plenary
power, the Court determined that states may make what amounts to a suspect classification of
Indians when enacting legislation in response to a federal law specifically-designed to readjust the
allocation ofjurisdiction over Indians. Id. at 501. Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that no suspect classification resulted from chapter 27-19. 364 N.W.2d at 107.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 104.
75. Id.; see also N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Section 9 ofarticle I of the North Dakota Constitution
provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in
such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by
law, direct.
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would be open to the tribe.7 6
The tribe also argued that the Chapter violated article I,
section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution, which requires all
laws of general nature to have a uniform operation. 7 7 The North
Dakota Supreme Court treated this as an equal protection
argument, and determined that no equal protection violation
existed because North Dakota had enacted chapter 27-19 in
78
response to federal authority.
Finally, the tribe argued that the Chapter violated article VI,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides that
district courts have original jurisdiction over all claims.7 9 The court
determined that this section was not violated since the district court
would have original jurisdiction if the tribe complied with the
statutory requirements of jurisdictional consent. 80 Thus, the court
determined that chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code
81
did not violate the North Dakota Constitution.
The court proceeded to state that chapter 27-19 does not
preclude Indian tribes or individual Indians from accepting state
civil jurisdiction. 82 Rather, the court stated, it restricts the state
judicial system by preventing the imposition of arbitrary and
unilateral jurisdiction over Indians against their will and without
their consent. 83 The court also stated that the Chapter does not
84
treat Indians less than equal, but treats them "more than equal.',
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
chapter 27-19 was the most fair and least restrictive alternative
85
available for the protection of the Indians' unique status.
76. 364 N.W.2d at 104. For a discussion of chapter 27-19, see supra notes 16-21 and
accompanying text.
77. 364 N.W.2d at 104; see also N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 22. Section 22 of article I of the North
Dakota Constitution provides that "[aIlllaws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."
Id.
78. 364 N.W.2d at 104. For a discussion of the North Dakota Supreme Court's rejection of
Three Affiliated Tribes' equal protection argument, see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
79. 364 N.W.2d at 104; see also N.D. CONsT. art. VI, 5 8. Section 8 of article VI of the North
Dakota Constitution provides as follows:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes, except as otherwise
provided by law, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law or by rule
of the supreme court. The district court shall have authority to issue such writs as are
necessary to the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
Id.
80. 364 N.W.2d at 104.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court determined that Indians were offered additional rights because they could
accept and later withdraw from state civil jurisdiction. Id. The court determined that Indians had
demanded the unique treatment that the Chapter offers. Id. Therefore, the court stated that it was
unreasonable for Indians to subsequently complain of such treatment and protection. Id.
85. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the result of cases like Three Affiliated
Tribes was that state courts lack jurisdiction to decide issues that "cry out" for an answer. Id. at 108;
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The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the current
status of Indian civil jurisdiction presents potential problems. 86 For
example, if Indians were allowed to sue but not be sued then they
would be immune from counterclaims by non-Indians in the same
action. 87 Furthermore, satisfication of a state court judgment in a
tribal court would be difficult because tribal courts are not bound
by the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution. 88 Another potential problem is that, even if Indians
do consent to state civil jurisdiction, settlement of a judgment
would be difficult because attachment of certain real or personal
property owned by Indians is prohibited by statute. 8 9
The court suggested three alternatives to resolve the
jurisdictional controversy regarding claims arising on Indian
reservations.9" First, the court stated that the simplest solution
would be for tribes to vote to accept state jurisdiction in all cases. 9 1
Second, the court suggested that the United States Congress
require Indian tribes to accept state court jurisdiction. 92 Finally,
the court suggested that the United States Congress create a federal
court with jurisdiction to decide all civil cases arising on Indian
reservations. 9 3 The court also proposed that the North Dakota
Legislature create an interim Indian jurisdiction committee to
see also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam) (consent of both-the state and
the Indian tribe is required before the state court may assert jurisdiction over an Indian); Schantz v.
White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (diversity jurisdiction cannot be based solely on the
fact that one party is an Indian and the other non-Indian); Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.
1975) (tribal court jurisdiction limited to cases involving less than $300).
86. 364 N.W.2d at 107-08.
87. See Erickstad, State of the Judiciary Address (located in Bench and Bar, reprinted in 62
N.D.L. REv. 117,119 (1986)) [hereinafter State of the Judiciary Address]. Chief.Justice Erickstad
stated that the nub of the problem regarding Indian civilijurisdiction may be the tribes' desire to have
access to state court without submitting to counterclaims in state court. Id.
88. See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980). In Malaterrethe court stated that
the full faith and credit clause does not require a tribal court to enforce a child custody modification
order by a state court, because the clause applies only to states. Id. at 144.
89. See N.D. CENT. ConE S 27-19-08 (Supp. 1985). Section 27-19-08 prohibits the alienation or
encumbrance of real or personal Indian property that is held in trust by the United States. Id. A
judgment requiring attachment of Indian property could arguably fall within this prohibition. Id.
For a brief discussion of 5 27-19-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 21.
90. 364 N.W.2d at 107.
91. Id.; seealso State of the judiciary Address, supra note 87. In his 1985 State of the JudiciaryMessage, ChiefJustice Erickstad summed up the Indian controversy as follows:
The Indian people will not receive justice on a par with other citizens of this state until
they realize that their rights are best preserved in the state courts and they vote to
accept state jurisdiction in all civil cases. Similarly, non-Indian people will not receive
justice on a par with other citizens of this state in disputes arising within the exterior
boundaries of Indian reservations until Indian people vote to accept state jurisdiction
in all civil cases. This initiative by Indian people is essential to future justice for both
the Indian people and North Dakota.
Id. at 119.
92. 364 N.W.2d at 107.
93 .Id
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study the problems resulting from Indians' unique status. 94 Until
some action is taken to address these problems, the courts of North
Dakota will continue to confront the conflict between the state and
federal statutes.

JULIE

L.

WIDLEY

94. Id. at 108. The court recognized the Indian civil jurisdictional controversy as a continuing
complex and emotional problem for both Indians and non-Indians. Id. at 107-08. The court stated as
follows:
Indians are now full citizens of this state, they have the franchise and they could
receive the fruits of justice in our state courts if they would but accept jurisdiction for
all civil purposes, submit their problems to those courts, and have faith in the judicial
system which all other citizens, irrespective of their ancestry, must and do rely upon.

